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UN Atomic Agency: Historic Turning Point

by William R. Frye

"It is not always easy to recognize a turning point in history. But I have often wondered . . . if the creation of this [atomic] agency might not represent such an occasion." So said James J. Wadsworth of the United States on the day that 82 nations, including the Soviet bloc, voted unanimously to approve the statute, or charter, of a United Nations atoms-for-peace agency.

It is already becoming clear that Mr. Wadsworth was too modest in his assessment of the agency. He need not have wondered. Its creation almost certainly is such a turning point. As it has emerged, the agency is not only to be the atomic Robin Hood that underdeveloped countries have wanted it to be; it is to become the control organ for a world-wide disarmament treaty, when and if signed.

For nine years the United States and the Soviet Union argued, in the UN and out, over which should come first: prohibition of atomic weapons or the establishment of control mechanisms. That argument is now over; a control mechanism is in existence or soon will be when 18 countries, including at least 3 of the atomic Big Five (the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain, France and Canada), have ratified the agency statute. There were people in the United States government who conceived of the agency from the very first as a veto-free disarmament control body. An early draft of the statute provided that "in carrying out its functions, the agency shall conduct its activities in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded world-wide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies."

This was a hint, but it was not a wholly explicit grant of authority. To make the point clear beyond any doubt, Thailand (with the United States holding its hand) proposed an amendment to the statute last month giving the agency broad power to "apply safeguards . . . at the request of a state to any of that state's activities in the field of atomic energy." The "safeguards" were carefully not specified; they were not limited to the particular steps the agency could take to make sure that states which receive its help do not use it to make bombs. The unspecified "safeguards" of the Thai amendment could be any control provisions agreed upon by countries entering into a disarmament treaty. These steps could in-

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clude aerial reconnaissance, for example, if the states which are parties to the disarmament treaty are willing to accept it. Thailand put forward this idea on October 2—and held its breath for Moscow's reaction. So did the United States. But there was not a word of protest from Soviet delegate Georgi N. Zarubin. The amendment passed 73-0 a week later without any significant adverse comment from any source and with only three countries abstaining from the vote.

The way for this decision was prepared by a protest from potential recipient states against the fact that they would be subject to controls while many other states would be perfectly free to build bombs. The answer — that no one would force them to come to the agency for help and thus become subject to its rules and regulations—was not very persuasive, since many of them had no practical alternative. Homi J. Bhabha of India argued strongly that because "a large part of the world [would be] subject to controls and the other free from them," the inequity should be adjusted by easing the control burden and leaving both parts of the world relatively free, at least up to the point where atomic fuel came out of its final processing plant ready to be put into a bomb. This the United States found an abhorrent and dangerous idea; and the Thai amendment—opening the way to controls on all rather than relative freedom for all—was the answer.

It remains, of course, for the powers granted by the Thai amendment to be used. Some means must be found to persuade the U.S.S.R. to accept inspection by the agency. The principal difficulty is not that outside inspection is anathema to the Russians; as a matter of fact, they have come a long way in the past year and a half in this respect.

Reason for Inspection

The real problem arises from the reason for the inspection. The purpose obviously would be to make certain that no more atomic fuel goes into bombs — that is, to enforce a "freeze" on present weapon stockpiles. Countries which have no such stockpile would not be permitted to obtain one; countries which do have a stockpile would have to draw from it in making all their future bombs. (Existing stockpiles cannot be outlawed because there is no sure way of finding them if they are hidden.) But this kind of "freeze" would work to the strategic advantage of the United States because our stockpiles are so much larger than those of the Soviet Union (some reports place them 100 to 1,000 times as large). We would have plenty of fuel for all the tactical weapons, all the missile warheads, all the antiaircraft and antimissile weapons we could conceivably need. But there is no assurance—nor even a likelihood—that the Russians are in that good a position. We proposed a "freeze" on March 1, 1956, but on September 11 Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin dismissed it as a "legalization" of nuclear weapons. Moreover, even our allies are cool to this plan. London wants at least a year or two to build up its stockpiles before they are frozen, and factions in the French government do not want France inhibited forever from building bombs.

All such considerations, however, are secondary when the overriding importance of stopping the nuclear weapons race is in the scales. If this race is not stopped, atomic bombs will soon be as common as artillery shells; dozens, if not scores, of small countries will have them. Thus the real core of the problem is to bring sufficient pressure on the U.S.S.R. to secure its agreement. Perhaps it can be done by obtaining from the UN General Assembly an overwhelming endorsement of the idea of placing all atomic plants everywhere under the agency's safeguards. It would be hard for the U.S.S.R. to hold out against the collective will of most of the rest of the world; and judging from the tenor of debate over the statute of the UN atoms-for-peace agency, there is a very widespread demand, especially among "have-not" countries, for such a step. Dr. Bhabha protested that the agency's control powers were "intended to insure . . . that not the slightest leakage takes place from the walls of a tank, while ignoring the fact that the tank has no bottom." He would have been willing to risk some leakage from the walls. The United States, on the other hand, would like to put in a bottom. If this can be done, there should be no question whatsoever that creation of the agency has been a turning point in history.

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H-Bomb Debate Helps Public

In the debate over H-bomb testing you apparently have a choice between "pie in the sky" or "mushrooms in the sky." It was "pie in the sky," according to President Eisenhower, when his rival proposed ending such tests; it will be "mushrooms in the sky" under the Eisenhower policy of continuing these tests, with their poisonous strontium-laden clouds rising into the stratosphere.

The debate, however, has proved of value to the American people, despite the Administration's efforts to cut it off. For, had not Adlai E. Stevenson continued to press the issue, the White House would not have told us many things that we now know about these testings, their purposes, their achievements.

At first the Administration's only reply to the Stevenson proposal was that Washington could not stop these tests unless the U.S.S.R. did too. Then, when Mr. Stevenson said we might stop the actual tests but not the research so that we would be in a position to resume testing immediately if the Russians fired an H-bomb, the White House answered such a policy was naïve and unrealistic, as research required tests whatever Moscow did.

Are 'Cleaner' Bombs Answer?

Second, when it was argued that testing bigger and bigger H-bombs was pointless, as they were already big enough to accomplish any conceivable military mission, it was disclosed that the tests were really designed to make smaller and "cleaner" H-bombs, not larger and more destructive ones. The Atomic Energy Commission announced with some satisfaction that it now could make "clean" (or at least "cleaner") H-bombs — and that was a big step forward.

The cleanliness of an H-bomb relates to the fallout that follows a blast. Since it is the fallout of strontium-90 that is so lethal over such vast areas, any way of reducing fallout is of great importance—but just how important is debatable. For while it is nice to know that "cleaner" H-bombs can be made, this implies that "dirty" H-bombs would not be used in any atomic war—by the U.S.S.R. as well as by the United States — and this would seem to be a most dangerous assumption on which to operate.

The debate so far has wound up inconclusively because always at some point in the exchange the White House states that top-secret matters are involved, implying that if only these could be divulged it would be obvious why tests must proceed. Since Mr. Stevenson did not have access to this top-level classified information, the debate, however it approaches the subject, eventually runs into this wall of secrecy.

It has been learned, however, that earlier this year the Administration itself seriously considered making just such a proposal as that of Stevenson and that a top-level group eventually threw it out, but far from unanimously. So if it is "wicked nonsense" for Stevenson to discuss the proposal on the basis of his limited information, it must have been "wicked nonsense" for the Administration to consider it—which it did—on the basis of its greater knowledge. In fact, some reports from within the Eisenhower Administration indicate that the White House might well have advocated just about what Mr. Stevenson urged, if the Democratic candidate had not beaten it to the punch.

But if the Administration is not concerned or alarmed over the strontium danger from further H-bomb tests, numerous physicists and atomic scientists are. It is true that the ranks of the atomic scientists are sharply divided on the deadliness and danger of further tests; but the list of those who view it with alarm is impressive, and since we are here dealing with a matter of life and death to the human race, it would seem the prudent, even politic, thing not to dismiss the alarm of reputable citizens and scientists.

Even the Atomic Energy Commission itself is divided on this issue, with Commissioner Thomas E. Murray urging an end to H-bomb tests but defending smaller atomic weapons testing. It is obvious also that much of the world, including such statesmen as Premier Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Pope Pius XII, who have publicly called for ending these superbomb tests, are sympathetic to the purpose and intent of Mr. Stevenson's statements.

Even though the Soviets may be devious in their offer to end tests and meddled in the Presidential campaign by pressing the issue at this time (as President Eisenhower has charged), the issue is too immense and the consequences too ghastly to be buried under the secrecy label or dismissed as *lèse majesté*. It is not enough to call the proposal "pie in the sky" when raised by Adlai Stevenson or "political interference" when raised by the U.S.S.R., for this does not dissipate the poisonous "mushrooms in the sky" with their earth-encircling doses of deadly strontium-90.

NEAL STANFORD

Should U.S. End H-Bomb Tests?

Because of the public interest aroused by the election campaign debate about H-bomb tests, the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN is publishing major statements on this subject by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Adlai E. Stevenson, as well as expressions of opinion by two groups of scientists.

WHAT REPUBLICANS THINK

President Eisenhower's statement on the hydrogen bomb tests, Washington, D.C., October 5, 1956, as reported in the New York Herald Tribune, *October 6, 1956:*

The American government's policy with respect to the testing of large-scale nuclear weapons has been made an issue in the current political campaign.

I regret this fact. The manner in which the issue has been raised can lead only to confusion at home and misunderstanding abroad. There is no subject more difficult than this to discuss before an audience of the whole world — which must include those hostile to us. There is no subject on which the American people should have so united an understanding, free of confusion or partisan differences.

I speak as President, charged under the Constitution with responsibility for the defense and security of our nation. I therefore must point out the following essentials in our national policy.

(1) The testing of atomic weapons to date has been—and continues—an indispensable part of our defense program. The development of these weapons has been a major, if not decisive, deterrent to Communist aggression in past years. And the importance of our strength in this particular field is sharply emphasized by the Communist world's numerical superiority in manpower.

(2) As part of a general disarmament program, the American government, at the same time, has consistently affirmed and reaffirmed its readiness—indeed, its strong will—to restrict and control both the testing and the use of nuclear weapons under specific and supervised international disarmament agreement. This fact is known to every government in the world. It can scarcely be unknown to any informed American citizen.

(3) In terms of our national weapons policy, it is the responsibility of specific officials of the government—notably the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President—to weigh, at all times, the proper emphasis on various types and sizes of weapons, their testing and development. Such emphasis is necessarily subject to constant review and re-examination. This specific matter is manifestly not a subject for detailed public discussion—for obvious security reasons. . . .

What Proposals Ignore

. . . The proposals clearly take no account of what would be the result of stopping our tests. Tests of large weapons by any nation may be detected when they occur. But any such test follows many months of research and preparation. This means that elaborate tests could be prepared by another nation without our knowledge. By the time we had such knowledge our present commanding lead in the field of nuclear weapons could be reduced or even overtaken. Thus our power to guard the peace would be weakened.

. . . The proposals made ignore some essential reasons for these tests:

(a) Our most recent tests have been those that have helped us to know how to make, not primarily weapons for vaster destruction, but weapons for defense of our cities against enemy air attack.

(b) As one important result of our latest tests, we have learned to make weapons which reduce fallout to a minimum and whose destructive effect can be concentrated upon military objectives.

. . . In the verbal confusion surrounding these proposals, an attempt has been made to cite, as having made "similar proposals," great world figures, even including His Holiness Pope Pius XII. All these men—like this government, like all responsible and thoughtful leaders in the free world, statesmen or churchmen—are sincerely anxious for international agreement allowing effective control of all armaments, nuclear or conventional.

The Pope in his last Christmas message to the world urged "a check on experiments in nuclear weapons by means of an international agreement." He stated that the matter involved "a question of three steps: renunciation of experimentation with atomic weapons; renunciation of the use of such, and general control of armaments." And he called for "the sum total of those three precautions."

. . . Within the last week yet another proposition has been advanced. This proposition denounced the government's "insistence" on "perfect" or "foolproof" supervision of disarmament as a "danger" imperiling any possible international agreement.

I must solemnly disagree. I shall continue this insistence for however long I am charged with chief re-

(Continued on page 38)

WHAT DEMOCRATS THINK

Adlai E. Stevenson's televised campaign speech, Chicago, Illinois, October 15, 1956, as reported in The New York Times, *October 16, 1956:*

These are the reasons why I think the time is ripe and there is an insistent necessity for the world to stop at least the testing of these terrifying weapons.

First, the H-bomb is already so powerful that a single bomb could destroy the largest city in the world. If every man, woman and child on earth were each carrying a 16-pound bundle of dynamite—enough to blow him to smithereens and then some—the destructive force in their arms would be equal to the force of one 20-megaton hydrogen bomb, which has already been exploded.

Second, the testing of an H-bomb anywhere can be quickly detected. You can't hide the explosion any more than you can hide an earthquake.

As the President has stated: "Tests of large weapons, by any nation, may be detected when they occur." In short, H-bomb testing requires no inspection. We will know it when it happens anywhere, and by studying the dust from that explosion we can determine what progress the other country has made. This means that if any country broke its pledge we would know it and could promptly resume our own testing.

Danger of Strontium-90

Third, these tests themselves may cause the human race unmeasured damage. With every explosion of a superbomb huge quantities of radioactive materials are pumped into the air currents of the world at all altitudes—later to fall to earth as dust or in rain. This radioactive "fallout" carries something called strontium-90, which is the most dreadful poison in the world. Only a tablespoon shared equally by all members of the human race would produce a dangerous level of radioactivity in the bones of every individual. In sufficient concentration, it can cause bone cancer and dangerously affect the reproductive processes.

Prior to the atomic age radioactive strontium was practically non-existent in the world. Careful studies show that today all of us—all over the world—have some of it in our bones. It enters our bodies through the foodstuffs grown in soil on which the bomb dust has fallen.

I do not wish to be an alarmist and I am not asserting that the present levels of radioactivity are dangerous. Scientists do not know exactly how dangerous the threat is. But they know the threat will increase if we go on testing. And we should remember that less than half of the strontium created by past tests by Russia and the United States has as yet fallen to earth from the stratosphere.

So it seems clear to me that if it is humanly possible we should stop sending this dangerous material into the air as soon as we can.

Fourth, the dangers of testing by three powers are ominous enough, but there is another reason why it is important to act now. Last May Mr. [Harold E.] Stassen, the President's disarmament assistant, said that within a year the "secret" of making the hydrogen bomb would spread around the world. Think what would happen if a maniac, another Hitler, had the hydrogen bomb. And imagine what the consequences would be if a dozen nations were conducting hydrogen bomb tests and wantonly thrusting radioactive matter into the atmosphere.

These are the reasons that it seems to me imperative that a world policy of stopping these tests be established at the very first possible moment. . . .

What are we waiting for?

It seems to me that we should lose no more time in starting to make the most of what appears to be a better climate for progress in this field. Therefore, if elected President, I would count it the first order of business to follow up on the opportunity presented now by the other atomic powers. I would do this by conference or by consultation—at whatever level — in whatever place — the circumstances might suggest would be most fruitful.

In the meantime—and frankly because bitter experience has proved that we cannot rely even on the firm agreement of one bloc of world powers—we will proceed both with the production of hydrogen weapons and with further research in the field.

There is little danger to national security involved because if another power conducts further tests we would know it and, as I have said, would have no choice but to resume such tests ourselves.

Report of October 19 statement by 62 scientists at the Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven National Laboratory at Upton, L.I., New York, as printed in The New York Times *on October 20, 1956:*

In a 350-word statement the Brookhaven employees, describing themselves as scientists, physicists and chemical biologists, said that the cur-

(Continued on page 38)

Democrats

(Continued from page 37)

rent discussion of control of the hydrogen bomb had shown "widespread misunderstanding" of the scientific facts.

"The problem," the scientists said, "is not whether strontium is dangerous — it is. In sufficient quantity it can cause bone tumors and affect the blood cells. "The question is whether the amount of strontium-90 produced by the tests is now or soon will be great enough to constitute such a hazard."

The scientists referred to a section of the report of the National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council, issued last June, in which it was concluded that the genetic effects—the danger to future generations — of atomic tests were "probably not more serious that those of X-rays."

But, the Brookhaven statement said, that part of the report does not discuss the hazard to the present generation from strontium-90. "This is a valid subject for further discussion and study," the scientists said.

In clarifying the statement, a spokesman for the signers said that as far as scientists knew, the effect of strontium-90 on genes was small. Genes carry hereditary characteristics. Therefore, he said, it could be perfectly true that current hydrogen bomb tests might have no appreciable effect, in terms of genetics, on future generations.

However, he said, the somatic effect of the nuclear tests—that is, the effect of current tests on the bodies of living persons—could be extremely dangerous. It is known, for example, that strontium-90 is found in the milk of cows that have grazed in areas contaminated by hydrogen bomb fallout.

The strontium-90 gets into bone tissue and has a calcium-like effect. It is suspected of causing bone tumors and blood diseases.

It is this problem, and not the genetic one, the spokesman said, that is the main worry of scientists. And yet, he contended, it is nearly always the negligible genetic effect that is emphasized and not the possible danger to living beings. . . .

The Brookhaven scientists said that "the possibility of detecting any large atomic tests is sufficiently high to serve as an effective deterrent to violations of an agreement [to end hydrogen bomb tests]."

'Decisions . . . 1957'

Now that elections are over, the American public will want to discuss the principal foreign policy decisions the United States faces in 1957. These decisions, as selected by a national committee for the FPA, will be analyzed in eight successive issues of the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, beginning December 1. Watch for the first "Decisions . . . 1957" article on United States-Russian relations.

If a nuclear explosion were very small, they said, it might escape long-range detection, "but such small explosions are not the subject of current discussion." With small explosions, they continued, "we could be as free as any other country to continue tests which produce no detectable fallout."

Republicans

(Continued from page 36)

sponsibility for the security of our nation.

The danger lies in exactly the opposite direction. It lies in the direction of the vain hope that something less than secure safeguards could justify any curtailment of our power to defend ourselves, our allies and the free world.

Finally, I reaffirm the steadfast intention of this government to continue striving ceaselessly to ease the burden of arms upon not just a few nations, but upon all peoples of the world.

Statement by 12 scientists (Dr. Roger Adams, Dr. John Bugher, Dr. Jesse W. Beams, Dr. John Dunning, Dr. G. Faila, Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Dr. Carroll Hochwalt, Dr. Warren C. Johnson, Dr. Mervin J. Kelly, Dr. Eger V. Murphree, Dr. C. P. Rhoads, Dr. J. C. Warner) sent to President Eisenhower by Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, as reported in the New York Herald Tribune *of October 20, 1956:*

Twelve scientists today gave their support to President Eisenhower and challenged the position of Adlai E. Stevenson in the bitter campaign dispute over continued testing of hydrogen bombs.

First, they said that until an international agreement on nuclear disarmament is reached "with guaranties which protect the American people and the peoples of the free world, we have no prudent course except to continue the development and testing of the most modern weapons of defense."

Then they implied that the danger from radioactive fallout from future hydrogen bomb tests continued "at the present rate" has been exaggerated by the Democratic Presidential nominee.

"We regret," they said, "the injection into a political campaign of statements and conclusions which extend beyond the limits of existing scientific evidence."

World Democratization — or World Chaos?

Future historians may find striking comparisons between 1956 and 1848. As if by a concerted explosion, nationalism, which some experts had thought was or should by now be obsolete, is sweeping the world, from Warsaw to Algiers, from Budapest to Cairo.

The impact of nationalism, as happened on the continent of Europe a century ago, is sapping the foundations of great empires—this time not only in Europe but in the Middle East, in North Africa, and in those remaining areas of Asia where nationalist aspirations have not yet been translated into the coherent form of organized states. And in spite of predictions by both Communists and anti-Communists that ideology, whether Marxist or democratic, would supersede nationalism, it is now clear that for better or worse, attachment to nation remains more powerful than attachment to any political or economic doctrine. Most significant of all perhaps is the fact that in spite of George Orwell's nightmare vision of a Big Brother apocalypse, neither Communist totalitarianism nor Western colonial repressions succeed in stifling thought or destroying the spirit of revolt.

At this turning point in history, when large areas of the world are smoldering or aflame, either spiritually or literally, prophecy as to the outcome is hazardous. Will the countries of Eastern Europe—which have long and perhaps mistakenly been described as "satellites" — once they have asserted their independence from and equality with the U.S.S.R., follow the example of Marshal Tito and adopt national communism—or will they go further, reject communism, and array themselves against Moscow? If they reject Moscow, will they then try to link themselves with the West through bilateral arrangements with the United States or through participation in some form of all-European union?

Plethora of Questions

If East Germany, taking a leaf from its neighbors' experience, throws off Russian control and joins West Germany in a once more unified German state, how will this unification affect the balance of power on the European continent? And in what way would the restoration of the German nation affect the future of the Eastern European countries which the Germans invaded and conquered twice in this century? How will Moscow view the international reorientation of countries which Russian rulers, Tsarist as well as Communist, have regarded as jumping-off places for German incursions into Russia? And meanwhile how will Britain and France meet the accelerating erosion of their remaining footholds in the Middle East and in North Africa?

Merely to raise these questions is to indicate the range and depth of the problems which the United States —with newly acquired stakes in all parts of the globe — will face now that the stalemate induced by common fear of nuclear warfare has been broken by nationalism and the *status quo,* which seemed to promise a period of relative stability, is no more. Among these problems three may prove particularly urgent:

1. *Should U.S. Help Revolts?* The traditional devotion of Americans to freedom for individuals and nations has caused the United States in the past to show sympathy for independence movements around the world. Since 1945, however, this sympathy has developed an ambivalent character. While the United States has called for "liberation" of the Eastern European countries, it has been increasingly cautious about supporting nationalist movements in the remaining colonial possessions of its Western European allies, on whose cooperation it has counted in efforts to check Russia and communism, and has deprecated the nationalism of Arab states. Henceforth, Washington may find it increasingly difficult to maintain this double standard. And it is possible that, as the Eastern European nations detach themselves from the U.S.S.R., at least to the extent of establishing national Communist regimes, the United States in turn will feel under less compulsion to back up Britain and France in Cyprus or Algeria.

The question may arise, however, as to the form American aid to rebels could or should take. The United States has indicated its readiness to give economic aid to Communist regimes which assert their independence from Moscow, as it has done in the case of Yugoslavia. It has also promised aid to Tunisia and Morocco, which, affronted by France's arrest of five leaders of the Algerian independence movement, are no longer willing to accept economic aid from Paris. But what if rebels in Eastern Europe and North Africa seek military intervention by the United States on their behalf? President Eisenhower in his Madison Square Garden address of October 25 said this country's purpose was

"to strengthen the love of liberty everywhere—and to do all within our peaceful power to help its champions." What will we decide to do if we are called on for action which goes beyond the definition of "peaceful"? Might we not face the risk of armed clashes with the U.S.S.R.—or even with our Western European allies, already disaffected by the course Washington has followed on Suez?

2. *What Should U.S. Do About Germany?* The rapid transformation of the political landscape in Europe will call for equally rapid review of United States policy on Germany. The unification of the two segments of the German nation, which only yesterday seemed an academic question to many Americans, may become a reality in the near future. And this could happen at a time when the withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Europe—demanded by Poland and Hungary—if carried out, would leave that strategic area, ancient battlefield of Teutons and Slavs, vulnerable to the aspirations of those Germans who have never become reconciled to the loss of Sudetenland to the Czechs and of the Oder-Neisse territories to the Poles.

Will the peoples of Eastern Europe, whose self-determination was encouraged in 1917 by an American President, Woodrow Wilson, find themselves once more between the devil and the deep blue sea—between continuance of Russian forces on their soil and the danger of a new German *Drang nach Osten?* And what will be the position of France, confronted by the prospect of a reunited, industrially recovered and financially strong German nation at a time when the French are engaged in mortal struggle in Algeria?

Should the United States encourage Germany's reunification, which it has hitherto urged Moscow to accept? Should it seek to devise safeguards for the Poles, Hungarians, French and even the Russians against the possible resumption by Germany of a dominant, and perhaps domineering, position on the European continent? If it does not, will Warsaw and Budapest as well as Prague, which has not yet forgotten Munich, continue to rely on the military backing of the U.S.S.R. even if they achieve control of their internal affairs? Should Washington consider the neutralization of Germany, previously proposed by Moscow? In short, is self-determination enough to assure democratization and security?

3. *What Should U.S. Do About Russia?* Since the end of World War II the foreign policy of the United States has been determined, in overwhelming degree, by the need to prevent aggression by Russia and/or Communist China and to check the spread of communism. Will the changes now under way in Eastern Europe weaken Russia and reduce, or even remove, this need? If so, what will be the effect of these changes on Washington's strategic concepts? Will the United States have to revise its policies on the H-bomb, on the draft, on overseas bases? Will our allies hasten to cut down their military expenditures and to reduce their military establishments? Will Germany still be interested in NATO?

Or will national Communist regimes, after an initial period of turmoil, actually tighten their ties with the U.S.S.R. and thus strengthen Moscow? Will we then face an even more baffling prospect of having to become reconciled with communism, perhaps not only in Moscow and Eastern Europe but also in Peiping?

The tide of nationalism, once more on the rise as in 1848, is obliterating familiar landmarks. From here on we shall have to blaze new trails in unexplored territory, as we seek a course between hoped-for democratization of the world community and the menace of world chaos. It may be a consolation to us in this task that the U.S.S.R., as well as our Western European allies, also faces the need for far-reaching readjustments.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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In this issue:

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—
France's Algerian Dilemma,
by Benjamin Rivlin